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Abstract—This paper addresses the problem of infinite-step
opacity and K-step opacity of discrete event systems modeled with
Petri nets. A Petri net system is said to be infinite-step/K-step
opaque if all its secret states remains opaque to an intruder for
any instant within infinite/K steps. In other words, the intruder is
never able to ascertain that the system used to be in a secrete state
within infinite/K steps based on its observation of the systems
evolution. Based on the notion of basis reachability and the two-
way observer, an efficient approach to verify infinite-step opacity
and K-step opacity is proposed.
Index Terms—Discrete event systems, Petri nets, Infinite-step
opacity, K-step opacity, Two-way observer.
I. INTRODUCTION
Motivated by the concern about security and privacy, opacity
has been wildly investigated in the past years [1], [2], [3], [4],
[5]. Opacity describes the ability of a system to hide its secret
behavior from the intruders. Different notions of opacity prop-
erties have been defined for discreat event systems (DESs),
including language-based opacity [2], [6], current-state opacity
[1], [3], initial-state opacity [4], [7], K-step opacity [8], [9],
infinite-step opacity [10], [11], etc. In particular, we discuss
K-step opacity and infinite-step opacity here.
Given a set of secret states, based on the observation of a
systems evolution, if the system can not be inferred that it used
to reach one of the secret states at any moment, the system is
infinite-step opaque. Analogously, a system is K-state opaque
if, given a set of secret states, by observing the sequence of
events generated by the system, the intruder will not be able
to infer that the system used to reach one of the secret states
within K steps.
The notion of K-step opacity was first proposed in [12]
in the nondeterministic finite automaton framework based
on the assumption that the events are partially observable.
Then Saboori and Hadjicostis [13] characterized the notion
of infinite-step opacity as an extension of the notion of K-step
opacity. Later, they explore the two opacity properties deeply
in [10], [14]. Saboori and Hadjicostis [10] have shown that
infinite-step opacity can be verified by constructing a current-
state estimator and a bank of initial-state estimators for a
given nondeterministic finite automaton, and the verification
of infinite-step opacity is proved to be PSPACE-hard. In [14],
K-delay state estimator of the system is introduced to check K-
step opacity with complexity of O((|Eo|+1)K×|Eo|×2|X|),
H. Lan, Y. Tong (Corresponding Author), and Jin Guo are with
the School of Information Science and Technology, Southwest Jiaotong
University, Chengdu 611756, China haolan@my.swjtu.edu.cn;
yintong@swjtu.edu.cn; jguo_scce@swjtu.edu.cn
C. Seaztu is with the Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering,
University of Cagliari, 09123 Cagliari, Italy seatzu@diee.unica.it
where X is the set of states and Eo is the set of observable
events of the system. Furthermore, more efficient approaches
are proposed to check both infinite-step opacity and K-step
opacity in [11], [15]. The approaches are based on the con-
struction of a new tool, called two-way observer. The two-way
observer (TW-observer) is built by concurrent composition of
two observers, one is the observer of the given automation,
another is the observer of the reverse automaton. Yin and
Lafortune [11] show that infinite-step opacity can be verified
with complexity of O(|Eo| × 2|X|× 2|X|) and K-step opacity
can be verified with complexity of O(min{2|X|, |Eo|K} ×
|Eo| × 2|X|). The notation of two opacity properties is also
extended to stochastic DESs [9], and the enforcement of the
K-step opacity is proposed in [8].
Petri nets have been wildly used to model and check
different types of opacity, e.g., initial-state opacity [7], current
state opacity [16], and language-based opacity [17]. Using
structural analysis and algebraic techniques, these problems
can be solved more efficiently by Petri net and its basis
reachability graph (BRG). To the best of our knowledge,
currently there is no work that study infinite-step opacity and
K-step opacity in labeled Petri nets (LPNs).
In this paper, the formalization and verification of infinite-
step opacity and K-step opacity in bounded labeled Petri
nets are addressed. The secret is defined as a subset of the
reachable markings. A labeled Petri net is infinite/K-step
opacity opaque with respect to a secret if the intruder can
never infer that the observed sequence used to origins from
a secret marking within infinite/K steps. Considering that a
possible non-secret marking that is reachable from a secret
basis marking by firing only unobservable transitions is unable
to be distinguished by the intruder, we make the following
reasonable assumption: if a basis marking belongs to a secret,
then all markings in its unobservable reach belong to the
secret. Then we prove that infinite-step opacity and K-step
opacity can be checked by using the BRG of the system.
We present necessary and sufficient conditions for infinite-step
opacity and K-step opacity, by analyzing the TW-observer of
the BRG of the original LPN system. Since BRG is usually
much smaller than the reachability grach (RG), this leads to
a relevant advantage in terms of computational complexity.
To reduce the complexity, we propose a new structure called
modified TW-observer to verify infinite-step opacity. In the
paper, we first extend the two opacity properties to labeled
Petri nets and then based on the notion of basis marking
efficient approaches to verify the two opacity properties are
proposed. The contributions of the work are summarized as
follows.
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2• Infinite-step opacity and K-step opacity are formally
defined in labeled Petri net systems.
• Under a reasonable assumption, efficient approaches to
verify the above two opacity properties in bounded la-
beled Petri nets are proposed. Based on basis markings,
enumerating all the markings that consistent with an
observation is avoided. By constructing the TW-observer
of the BRG, the two opacity properties can be checked.
• Differently from [11], we propose a modified TW-
observer to check infinite-step opacity, whose computa-
tional complexity is lower than the construction method
in [11].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II
background on finite automata and labeled Petri nets are
recalled. Infinite-step opacity and K-step opacity in labeled
Petri nets are defined in Section III. In Section IV, the
fomalizition and property of the BRG are presented. Efficient
approaches to verify Infinite-step opacity and K-step opacity
are proposed in Section V. Conclusions are finally drawn in
Section VI where our future lines of research in this framework
are illustrated.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND BACKGROUND
In this section we recall the formalisms used in the paper
and some results on state estimation in labeled Petri nets. For
more details, we refer to [18], [19], [20].
A. Automata
A nondeterministic finite (state) automaton (NFA) is a 4-
tuple A = (X,EA, f, x0), where X is the finite set of states,
EA is the finite set of events, f : X × Eε → 2X is the
(partial) transition relation, Eε = EA ∪ {ε}, and x0 ∈ X is
the initial state. The transition relation f can be extended to
f : X × E∗ε → 2X in a standard manner. Given an event
sequence w ∈ E∗ε , if f(x0, w) is defined in A, f(x0, w) is
the set of states reached in A from x0 with w occurring. We
denote as AR = (X,EA, fR, X) the reverse automation of A.
The reverse automation AR is constructed by revising all arcs
in A without specifying the initial states.
Given an NFA, its equivalent DFA, called observer, can be
constructed following the procedure in Section 2.3.4 of [21].
Each state of the observer is a subset of states of X in which
the NFA may be after a certain event sequence has occurred.
The complexity of computing the observer is O(2n), where n
is the number of states of A.
B. Petri Nets
A Petri net is a structure N = (P, T, Pre, Post), where
P is a set of m places, graphically represented by circles;
T is a set of n transitions, graphically represented by bars;
Pre : P × T → N and Post : P × T → N are the pre- and
post-incidence functions that specify the arcs directed from
places to transitions, and vice versa. The incidence matrix of
a net is denoted by C = Post − Pre. A Petri net is acyclic
if there are no oriented cycles.
A marking is a vector M : P → N that assigns to each
place a non-negative integer number of tokens, graphically
represented by black dots. The marking of place p is denoted
by M(p). A marking is also denoted by M =
∑
p∈P M(p) ·p.
A Petri net system 〈N,M0〉 is a net N with initial marking
M0.
A transition t is enabled at marking M if M ≥ Pre(·, t)
and may fire yielding a new marking M ′ = M + C(·, t).
We write M [σ〉 to denote that the sequence of transitions σ =
tj1 · · · tjk is enabled at M , and M [σ〉M ′ to denote that the fir-
ing of σ yields M ′. The set of all enabled transition sequences
in N from marking M is L(N,M) = {σ ∈ T ∗|M [σ〉}. Given
a transition sequence σ ∈ T ∗, the function pi : T ∗ → Nn
associates with σ the Parikh vector y = pi(σ) ∈ Nn, i.e.,
y(t) = k if transition t appears k times in σ. Given a sequence
of transitions σ ∈ T ∗, its prefix, denoted by σ′  σ, is a string
such that ∃σ′′ ∈ T ∗ : σ′σ′′ = σ. The length of σ is denoted
by |σ|.
A marking M is reachable in 〈N,M0〉 if there exists a tran-
sition sequence σ such that M0[σ〉M . The set of all markings
reachable from M0 defines the reachability set of 〈N,M0〉,
denoted by R(N,M0). Given a marking M ∈ R(N,M0), we
define
UR(M) = {M ′ ∈ Nm|M [σu〉M ′, σu ∈ T ∗u}
its unobservable reach, the set of markings reachable from
M through unobservable transitions. A Petri net system is
bounded if there exists a non-negative integer k ∈ N such
that for any place p ∈ P and any reachable marking M ∈
R(N,M0), M(p) ≤ k holds.
A labeled Petri net (LPN) system is a 4-tuple G = (N,M0,
E, `), where 〈N,M0〉 is a Petri net system, E is the alphabet
(a set of labels) and ` : T → E ∪ {ε} is the labeling function
that assigns to each transition t ∈ T either a symbol from E
or the empty word ε. Therefore, the set of transitions can be
partitioned into two disjoint sets T = To ∪ Tu, where To =
{t ∈ T |`(t) ∈ E} is the set of observable transitions with
|To| = no and Tu = T \ To = {t ∈ T |`(t) = ε} is the
set of unobservable transitions with |Tu| = nu. The labeling
function can be extended to transition sequences ` : T ∗ → E∗
as `(σt) = `(σ)`(t) with σ ∈ T ∗ and t ∈ T . Given a set
Y ⊆ R(N,M0) of markings, the language generated by G
from Y is
L(G, Y ) =
⋃
M∈Y
{w ∈ E∗|∃σ ∈ L(N,M) : w = `(σ)}.
In particular, the language generated by G is
L(G, {M0}) = {w ∈ E∗|∃σ ∈ L(N,M0) : w = `(σ)},
that is also simply denoted by L(G). Let w ∈ L(G) be an
observed word. We denote as
C(w) = {M ∈ Nm|∃σ ∈ L(N,M0) : M0[σ〉M, `(σ) = w}
the set of markings consistent with w.
Given an LPN system G = (N,M0, E, `) and the set of
unobservable transitions Tu, the Tu-induced subnet N ′ =
(P, T ′, P re′, Post′) of N , is the net resulting by removing
all transitions in T \ Tu from N , where Pre′ and Post′
are the restriction of Pre, Post to Tu, respectively. The
incidence matrix of the Tu-induced subnet is denoted by
Cu = Post
′ − Pre′.
3III. INFINITE-STEP OPACITY AND K-STEP OPACITY IN
LABELED PETRI NETS
Infinite-step opacity and K-step opacity have been defined
in automation [10], [11], [14]. In this section we extend these
two opacity properties to labeled Petri nets.
In the framework of LPN system, we denote a secret as a set
of reachable makings S ⊆ R(N,M0). A marking M ∈ S is a
secret marking. Markings in S¯ = R(N,M0)\S are non-secret
markings.
Definition 3.1: [Infinite-Step Opacity] Let G = (N,M0,
E, `) be an LPN system and S ⊆ R(N,M0) be a secret.
System G is infinite-step opacity with respect to S if ∀σ1σ2 ∈
L(G) with M0[σ1〉M1 ∈ S, there exists σ′1σ′2 ∈ L(G) such
that M0[σ′1〉M ′1 /∈ S, where `(σ1) = `(σ′1), `(σ2) = `(σ′2). 
In words, an LPN system is infinite-step opaque if for any
marking M ∈ S reaching from the initial marking, that there
exists a marking M ′ with the same observation that is not
belong to S, and M,M ′ can generate same language. Namely,
the system is infinite-step opacity if the intruder cannot infer
that the system used to reach a state that is belong to the
secret.
Definition 3.2: [K-Step Opacity] Let G = (N,M0, E, `)
be an LPN system, K ∈ N be a integer and S ⊆ R(N,M0)
be a secret. System G is K-step opaque with respect to S
if ∀σ1σ2 ∈ L(G) with M0[σ1〉M1 ∈ S and |`(σ2)| ≤ K,
there exists σ′1σ
′
2 ∈ L(G) such that M0[σ′1〉M ′1 /∈ S, where
`(σ1) = `(σ
′
1), `(σ2) = `(σ
′
2). 
In words, an LPN system is K-step opaque if for any
marking M ∈ S reaching from the initial marking, that there
exists a marking M ′ with the same observation that is not
belong to S, and any word generated by M within K steps,
there are always same word generated by M ′. Namely, the
system is K-step opaque if the intruder cannot infer that the
system used to reach a state that is belong to the secret within
K steps. Clearly, when K = ∞, it becomes infinite-step
opacity, and when K = 0, it becomes curent-state opacity
[16].
Example 3.3: Let us consider the LPN system in Fig. 1(a)
where the observable transitions is To = {t2, t3, t6, t7, t8} and
the unobservable transitions is Tu = {t1, t4, t5}. Transitions
t2, t3, t6 and t8 are labeled a, transition t7 is labeled b. The
RG of the LPN system is shown in Fig. 1(b). Let the secret
be S = {M2,M4}. Since M0[t1t2〉M2 ∈ S, clearly there
exists a transition sequence t1t3 that is M0[t1t3〉M3 /∈ S and
`(t1t2) = `(t1t3). However, at M2, transition sequence t4t6
is the only transtion sequence that enabled, while transiton
sequence t5t7 is the only transiton sequence that can fire at
M3. Since `(t4t6) 6= `(t5t7) and |`(t4t6)| = 1, according to
Definition 3.2, K = 0, i.e., the system is 0-step opaque (of
course, not infinite-step opaque). 
In the following, based on the given secret, we define the
secret language and the non-secret language.
We denote as S(w) = C(w) ∩ S the set of secret markings
consistent with a given observation w ∈ L(G), and S¯(w) =
C(w) \ S(w) be the set of non-secret markings consistent
with w. The secret language generated by S(w) is defined
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Fig. 1. The LPN system in Example 3.3 (a), and its RG (b).
as L(G,S(w)) = ⋃M∈S(w) L(G,M) and the non-secret
language is defined as L(G, S¯(w)) = ⋃M∈S¯(w) L(G,M).
Lemma 3.4: Let G = (N,M0, E, `) be an LPN system
and S ⊆ R(N,M0) be a secret. System G is infinite-step
opaque with respect to S if and only if ∀w ∈ L(G), such that
L(G,S(w)) ⊆ L(G, S¯(w)).
Proof: Follows from Definitions 3.1.
In a simple word, an LPN system is infinite-step opaque
with respect to a given secret if and only if for any observation,
its corresponding secret language is a subset of the non-secret
language.
Lemma 3.5: Let G = (N,M0, E, `) be an LPN system and
S ⊆ R(N,M0) be a secret. System G is K-step opaque with
respect to S if and only if ∀w ∈ L(G), such that ∀w′ ∈
L(G,S(w)) with |w′| ≤ K, that w′ ∈ L(G, S¯(w)).
Proof: Follows from Definitions 3.2.
In a simple word, an LPN system is K-step opaque with
respect to a given secret if and only if for any observation,
any word generated within K steps in its corresponding secret
language is also belong to the non-secret language.
Therefore by Lemmas 3.4 and 3.5, the infinite-step opacity
and K-step opacity problem in LPN systems is equivalent to
the language containment problem.
IV. BASIS REACHABILITY GRAPH
In the automaton framework, two-way observer (TW-
observer) is used to verify the infinite-step opacity and K-step
opacity [11]. Obviously, in the case of bounded LPN system
the same approach can be used first constructing the RG of
the net system and then computing its TW-observer. However,
the complexity of constructing the RG of a Petri net system is
exponential in the size of the net (number of places, transitions,
tokens in the initial marking) and the approach in [11] has the
complexity of O(|Eo| × 2|X| × 2|X|), where Eo is the set of
events, and X is the set of states. Thus, such an approach
could be unfeasible in the case of systems with a large state
space. In this paper, we propose a new approach based on the
notion of basis marking and basis reachability graph to check
the above two opacity properties, thus enumerating all states
in RG is avoided.
In this section, using the notion of basis marking, we
introduce the fomalizition and the property of the BRG for
4opacity. Then under a reasonable assumption we prove that
infinite-step opacity and K-step opacity of the LPN system
can be checked by using BRG. Thus we first review the notion
and some results of basis markings, which is proposed in [18],
[22].
Definition 4.1: Given a marking M and an observable
transition t ∈ To, we denote as
Σ(M, t) = {σ ∈ T ∗u |M [σ〉M ′,M ′ ≥ Pre(·, t)}
the set of explanations of t at M and Y (M, t) = {yu ∈
Nnu |∃σ ∈ Σ(M, t) : yu = pi(σ)} the set of e-vectors. 
After firing any unobservable transition sequence in Σ(M, t)
at M , the transition t is enabled. To provide a compact
representation of the reachability set, we are interested in
finding the explanations whose firing vector is minimal.
Definition 4.2: Given a marking M and an observable
transition t ∈ To, we denote as
Σmin(M, t) = {σ ∈ Σ(M, t)|@σ′ ∈ Σ(M, t) : pi(σ′)  pi(σ)}
the set of minimal explanations of t at M and Ymin(M, t) =
{yu ∈ Nnu |∃σ ∈ Σmin(M, t) : yu = pi(σ)} as the
corresponding set of minimal e-vectors. 
There are many approaches to calculate Ymin(M, t). In par-
ticular, Cabasino et al present an approach that only requires
algebraic manipulations when the Tu-induced subnet is acyclic
[18].
Definition 4.3: Given an LPN system G = (N,M0, E, `)
whose Tu-induced subnet is acyclic, its basis marking setMb
is defined as follows:
• M0 ∈Mb;
• If M ∈Mb, then ∀t ∈ To, yu ∈ Ymin(M, t),
M ′ = M + C(·, t) + Cu · yu ⇒M ′ ∈Mb.
A marking Mb ∈Mb is called a basis marking of G. 
The set of basis markings contains the initial marking and
all other markings that are reachable from a basis marking by
firing a transition sequence σut, where t ∈ To is an observable
transition and pi(σu) = yu is a minimal explanation of t at M .
Note that t is enabled at some marking in the unobservable
reach of M . Clearly, Mb ⊆ R(N,M0), and in practical cases
the number of basis markings is much smaller than the number
of reachable markings [18], [22], [23]. And the number of
basis markings is finite if the corresponding LPN system is
bound. We denote as Cb(w) = Mb ∩ C(w) the set of basis
markings corresponding to a given observation w ∈ L(G).
To guarantee that the BRG is finite, we assume that the
LPN system is bounded. Based on Definition 4.3, we denote
as B = (X,E, f, x0) the BRG of a bounded LPN system
G = (N,M0, E, `). X =Mb is a finite set of states, x0 ∈ X
is the initial state of the BRG. The event set of the BRG is
the alphabet E. The transition function f : X × E → X can
be determined by the following rule. If at marking Mb there
is an observable transition t for which a minimal explanation
exists, then we compute the markings reached firing t and its
minimal explanations. Let M ′b be one of such markings, then
an edge from node Mb to node M ′b labeled `(t) is defined in
the BRG. The BRG of the LPN system can be constructed by
applying the algorithm in [20].
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Fig. 2. BRG of the LPN system Fig. 1 (a), and the reversed BRG (b).
We denote the language generated by BRG B from a basis
marking Mb as L(B,Mb). According to the construction of
the BRG, if a marking M ∈ UR(Mb) in G, then L(G,M) ⊆
L(B,Mb). Given a BRG B = (X,E, f, x0), we denote as
BR = (X,E, fr, X) the reversed BRG. The initial state of
BR is the entire state space X .
Example 4.4: Let us consider again the LPN system in
Fig. 1(a) whose Tu-induced subnet is acyclic, the RG of
the LPN system is shown in Fig. 1(b). The LPN system
has 7 reachable markings and only 4 of them are basis
markingsMb = {M0,M2,M3,M6}. The corresponding BRG
is presented in Fig. 2(a), and the reversed BRG is shown in
Fig. 2(b). 
Definition 4.5: Let G = N,M0, E, `) be an LPN system,
Mb be the set of basis markings, and S(w) be the set of
secret markings consistent with w. The secret basis marking
set consistent with w Sb(w) is defined as Sb(w) = S(w)∩Mb,
and the non-secret basis marking set consistent with w S¯b(w)
is defined as S¯b(w) = S¯(w) ∩Mb, 
Since Sb(w) ⊆ S(w) and S¯b(w) ⊆ S¯(w), we have
L(B,Sb(w)) ⊆ L(G,S(w)) and L(B, S¯b(w)) ⊆ L(G, S¯(w)).
However, L(B,Sb(w)) ⊆ L(B, S¯b(w)) does not imply that
L(G,S(w)) ⊆ L(G, S¯(w)). Thus, to use the BRG, we make
the following assumption:
A1: ∀Mb ∈ S,UR(Mb) ⊆ S.
In other words, if a basis marking is a secret marking, then
the set of the markings in its unobservable reach belong to
the secret. Namely, for all secret basis markings there does
not exist an unobservable truansition that leads to a non-secret
marking.
Proposition 4.6: Let G be an LPN system whose Tu-induced
subnet is acyclic, and S be a secret which satisfy Assumption
A1. Let B be the BRG and Mb be the set of basis markings
of G. It holds that L(B, S¯b(w)) = L(G, S¯(w)).
Proof: First, we prove L(B, S¯b(w)) ⊆ L(G, S¯(w)). Since
S¯b(w) ⊆ S¯(w), L(B, S¯b(w)) = L(G, S¯b(w)) ⊆ L(G, S¯(w)).
Now, we prove L(B, S¯b(w)) ⊇ L(G, S¯(w)). Let a marking
M ∈ S¯(w), (case 1) if M ∈Mb, then L(G,M) = L(B,M);
(case 2) if M /∈ Mb, let Mb be the corresponding basis
marking of M , namely, M ∈ UR(Mb). If Mb ∈ Sb(w), by
Assumption A1, M ∈ S, thus it is contradicted. Therfore,
Mb ∈ S¯b(w), since M ∈ UR(Mb), L(G,M) ⊆ L(B,M).
Therefore, L(G, S¯(w)) ⊆ L(B, S¯b(w)).
5In a simple wrod, given an LPN system, if S¯b(w) is a non-
secret basis marking set of S¯(w), the language generated from
S¯(w) in RG is equel to the language generated from S¯b(w)
in the corrsponding BRG.
Now accroding to the assumption A1, we can propose the
following proposition.
Proposition 4.7: Let G be an LPN system whose Tu-induced
subnet is acyclic, and S be a secret which satisfy Assumption
A1. Let B be the BRG and Mb be the set of basis markings
of G. We have L(G,S(w)) ⊆ L(G, S¯(w)) if and only if
L(B,Sb(w)) ⊆ L(B, S¯b(w)).
Proof: (If) Since L(B,Sb(w)) = L(G,Sb(w)) and
by Proposition 4.6, L(B,Sb(w)) ⊆ L(B, S¯b(w)) ⇔
L(G,Sb(w)) ⊆ L(G, S¯(w)). Let a marking M ∈ S(w),
(case 1) if M ∈ Mb, then M ∈ Sb(w). Thus L(G,M) ⊆
L(G,Sb(w)) ⊆ L(G, S¯(w)). (Case 2) If M /∈ Mb, let
Mb be the corresponding basis marking of M , namely,
M ∈ UR(Mb). Thus L(G,M) ⊆ L(G,Mb). If Mb ∈
S, then Mb ∈ Sb(w), thus L(G,M) ⊆ L(G,Mb) ⊆
L(G,Sb(w)) ⊆ L(G, S¯(w)); if Mb /∈ S, then Mb ∈
S¯b(w), thus L(G,M) ⊆ L(G,Mb) ⊆ L(G, S¯(w)). Therefore
L(G,S(w)) ⊆ L(G, S¯(w)).
(Only if) Since Sb(w) ⊆ S(w), L(B,Sb(w)) =
L(G,Sb(w)) ⊆ L(G,S(w)). By assumption L(G,S(w)) ⊆
L(G, S¯(w)), thus L(B,Sb(w)) ⊆ L(G, S¯(w)). According
to Proposition 4.6, L(B, S¯b(w)) = L(G, S¯(w)), therefore
L(B,Sb(w)) ⊆ L(B, S¯b(w))
In words, by assumption A1, the language containment
problem in the RG can be transformed into that in the BRG.
Thus we can rewriting the Lemmas 3.4 and 3.5 to the following
two propositons respectively.
Proposition 4.8: Let G = (N,M0, E, `) be an LPN system
whose Tu-induced subnet is acyclic, and S be a secret which
satisfy Assumption A1. System G is infinite-step opaque with
respect to S if ∀w ∈ L(G) with Sb(w) 6= ∅, such that
L(B,Sb(w)) ⊆ L(B, S¯b(w)).
Proof: Follows from Lemma 3.4 and Proposition 4.7.
Proposition 4.9: Let G = (N,M0, E, `) be an LPN system
whose Tu-induced subnet is acyclic, and S be a secret which
satisfy Assumption A1. System G is K-step opaque with
respect to S if ∀w ∈ L(G) with Sb(w) 6= ∅, such that
∀w′ ∈ L(B,Sb(w)) with |w′| ≤ K, that w′ ∈ L(B, S¯b(w)).
Proof: Follows from Lemma 3.5 and Proposition 4.7.
In other words, Propositions 4.8 to 4.9 proves that the
infinite-step opacity and K-step opacity problem in the LPN
system is equivalent to the language containment problem in
the corresponding BRG. Thus, in the following, we can check
the two opacity properties by the analysis of the BRG of the
LPN system.
V. VERIFICATION OF THE TWO OPACITY PROPERTIES
In this section we first briefly recall a technique that is used
to verify infinite-step opacity and K-step opacity in automata
[11]. Based on the result in the previous section, we show that
by applying the technique to the BRG of an LPN system, the
two opacity properties of the LPN system can be effectively
verified.
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Fig. 3. The observer of the BRG in Fig. 2 (a), and the initial-estimator of
the BRG (b).
In [11] an automaton called two-way observer (TW-
observer) is proposed based on the two observers, one is the
observer of the original discrete event system and another is
the observer of the reverse automaton of the original system
(the second observer is also called initial state estimator in [3],
[7]).
We denote as Bo = (X , E, fo, 0) the observer of the BRG
B = (X,E, f, x0). The initial-state estimator of the BRG is
denoted by Be = (Xe, E, fe, X¯0), as mentioned bove, the
initial-state estimator Be is the observer of the reversed BRG
BR.
Example 5.1: Consider again the LPN system in Fig. 1(a)
whose Tu-induced subnet is acyclic, the observer of its BRG is
presented in Fig. 3(a), and the observer of the reversed BRG,
i.e., the initial-state estimator is shown in Fig. 3(b). Given
an observation w = ba, in the estimator, the reached state is
{M0}, which implies that the set of states that can generate
w′ = ab in observer is state {M0} in Fig. 3(a). 
Proposition 5.2: Let G be an LPN system whose Tu-induced
subnet is acyclic, Bo = (X , E, fo, Xˆ0) be the observer of its
BRG, Be = (Xe, E, fe, X¯0) be the initial-state estimator of
the BRG, and S be a secret. System G is infinite-step opaque
with respect to S if and only if
∀w1w2 ∈ L(G) : fo(Xˆ0, w1) ∩ fe(X¯0, wr2) * S,
where wr2 is the reversed word of w2.
Proof: Follow from Proposition 1 and Theorem 2 in [11].
The above proposition implies that, an LPN system is
infinite-step opaque with respect to S if and only if for any
intersection of the observer and the initial-state estimator that
it is not belong to the secret.
A. Verification of the infinite-step opacity
In [11], infinite-step opacity can be checked by the approach
based on the TW-observer. Obviously, the same approach can
be used in BRG. However, there are too many transitions in
the TW-observer, and we find there is no need for so many
transitions to check infinite-step opacity. Thus, we propose an
algorithm to build a modified TW-observer which reduces the
number of transitions to reduce the complexity.
Given a BRG B = (X,E, f, x0), the observer of the
BRG is Bo = (X , E, fo, Xˆ0) and the initial-state estima-
tor of the BRG is Be = (Xe, E, fe, X¯0). We denote as
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Fig. 4. The modefied TW-observer of the LPN system in Fig. 1(a).
Btw = (Q,Etw, ftw, q0) the modified TW-observer of the
BRG. Q ⊆ X × Xe is a finite set of states, the initial state
of the modefied TW-observer is the combination of the initial
markings of Bo and Be, that is q0 = (Xˆ0, X¯0) ∈ Q, and each
state q in Btw consists of two components, we denote as q =
(q(1), q(2)) ∈ Q with the first component q(1) ∈ X and the
second component q(2) ∈ Xe. Etw = (E ×{λ})∪ ({λ}×E)
is the event set of the modefied TW-observer. The transition
function ftw : Q× Etw → Q.
The procedure to construct the modified TW-observer for
the opacity is summarized in Algorithm 1, which works as
follows. First, we search the transitions from the initial state
q0 = (Xˆ0, X¯0) for the second element. We search for all the
reachable state from the X¯0 to build new states and keep the
first component of each new states at the initial state Xˆ0. And
we label each transitions in the form of (λ, e) (Steps 3 to 12).
Then we search the transitions from the set of states that have
been build, and keep the second element not changed. These
transitions are labeled in the form of (e, λ) (Steps 13 to 23).
Clearly, the modified TW-observer is a sub-automaton of the
TW-observer in [11].
Example 5.3: Consider again the LPN system in
Fig. 1(a) whose Tu-induced subnet is acyclic. The mode-
fied TW-observer of the LPN system is shown in Fig. 4.
In Fig. 4, for example, state (Xˆ2, X¯1) represent state
({M6}, {M0,M2,M6}), which can be reached by string
(λ, a)(a, λ)(b, λ). 
Proposition 5.4: Let G be an LPN system whose Tu-induced
subnet is acyclic, Btw = (Q,Etw, ftw, q0) be the modified
TW-observer of its BRG, and S be a secret. There exists a
state q = (q(1), q(2)) ∈ Q if and only if there exist a state
q(1) ∈ X and a state q(2) ∈ Xe.
Proof: Follow from the Algorithm 1.
In other words, for an LPN system, there exists a state q in
the modefied TW-observer of its BRG if and only if the first
element of q exists in the observer, while the second element
of q exists in the initial-state estimator.
Theorem 5.5: Let G be an LPN system whose Tu-induced
subnet is acyclic, Btw = (Q,Etw, ftw, q0) be the modefied
TW-observer of its BRG, and S be a secret. System G is
infinite-step opaque with respect to S if and only if ∀q =
(q(1), q(2)) ∈ Q, such that
q(1) ∩ q(2) * S ∨ q(1) ∩ q(2) = ∅
Algorithm 1 Computation of the modified TW-observer
Input: A observer Bo = (X , E, fo, Xˆ0); A initial-state esti-
mator Be = e, E, fe, X¯0).
Output: A modified TW-observer Btw = (Q,Etw, ftw, q0).
1: q0 := (Xˆ0, X¯0).
2: Q := {q0}, Qnew := {q0}.
3: for all q = (q(1), q(2)) ∈ Qnew, do
4: for all e ∈ E: fe(q(2), e)!, do
5: q′ := (q(1), fe(q(2), e)),
6: ftw(q, (λ, e)) := q
′,
7: if q′ /∈ Q, then
8: Q := Q ∪ {q′}, Qnew := Qnew ∪ {q′},
9: end if
10: end for
11: Qnew := Qnew \ {q}.
12: end for
13: Qtem := Q.
14: for all q = (q(1), q(2)) ∈ Qtem, do
15: for all e ∈ E: fo(q(1), e)!, do
16: q′ := (fo(q(1), e), q(2)),
17: ftw(q, (e, λ)) := q
′,
18: if q′ /∈ Q, then
19: Q := Q ∪ {q′}, Qtem := Qtem ∪ {q′},
20: end if
21: end for
22: Qtem := Qtem \ {q}.
23: end for
Proof: Follow from the Propositions 5.2 and 5.4.
In simple words, an LPN system is infinite-step opaque with
respect to S if and only if for any state q in the modefied
TW-observer such that the intersection of the first and second
elements of q does not belong to the secret or is empty.
Example 5.6: Consider again the LPN system in Fig. 1(a)
whose Tu-induced subnet is acyclic, where the secret S =
{M2,M4}. The modefied TW-observer of the LPN system
is shown in Fig. 4. Let S = {M2,M4}. According to
Theorem 5.5, the LPN system is not infinite-step opaque wrt S,
since there exists a state (Xˆ1, X¯1) that Xˆ1∩X¯1 = {M2} ⊆ S.

Remark 1: We discuss the computational complexity of the
construction of the modified TW-observer for the verification
of infinite-step opacity. By Algorithm 1, in the worst case,
there are at most 2|X| × 2|X| states and |Eo| × 2|X| × 2|X| +
|Eo|×2|X| transitions in the modified TW-observer. Therefore,
the complexity of the proposed algorithm is of O(|Eo|×2|X|×
2|X|). In [11], Yin and Lafortune claim that there are |Eo| ×
2|X| × 2|X| transitions in the TW-observer, but actually there
are 2×|Eo|×2|X|×2|X| transitions since they just concurrent
composition the two observers and the mark of the transitions
on the two observers is different. Therefore, our algorithm is
more efficient than that in [11].
B. Verification of the K-step opacity
In this subsection, we use the K-reduced TW-observer,
which was proposed in [11], to check K-step opacity. We de-
note as Bktw = (Qk, E, fktw, qk0) the K-reduced TW-observer
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Fig. 5. The K-reduced TW-observer of the LPN system in Fig. 1(a).
of the BRG. The K-reduced TW-observer is constructed to
search all the states that can be reached from the initial state
by observations whose length of the second elment is smaller
than or equal to K. The K-reduced TW-observer of a BRG can
be constructed by applying Algorithm 1 in [11], and Theorem
7 in [11] can be directly applied on BRG.
Theorem 5.7: Let G be an LPN system, Bktw = (Qk, E,
fktw, qk0) be the K-reduced TW-observer of its BRG, and S
be a secret. System G is K-step opacity with respect to S if
and only if ∀qk = (qk(1), qk(2)) ∈ Qk, such that
qk(1) ∩ qk(2) * S ∨ qk(1) ∩ qk(2) = ∅.
In simple words, an LPN system is K-step opaque with
respect to S if and only if for any state qk in the K-reduced
TW-observer such that the intersection of the first and second
elements of qk does not belong to the secret or is empty.
Example 5.8: Consider again the LPN system in Fig. 1(a)
whose Tu-induced subnet is acyclic, where the secret S =
{M2,M4}. Let K = 1, thus from the initial state (Xˆ0, X¯0),
only states (Xˆ0, X¯1) and (Xˆ0, X¯2) are 1 step away from
the second element of the initial state. And then from the
three states, we search the other states though first element
of these states. Therefore, the K-reduced TW-observer of the
LPN system is shown in Fig. 5. According to Theorem 5.7,
the LPN system is not K-step opaque wrt S, since there exists
a state (Xˆ1, X¯1) that Xˆ1 ∩ X¯1 = {M2} ⊆ S. 
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, infinite-step opacity and K-step opacity of
labeled Petri nets are proposed and approaches to verify them
are provided. Under an acceptable assumption on the secret,
we proved that the infinite-step opacity and K-step opacity
can be checked by the basis reachability graph (BRG) and its
two-way observer (TW-observer). Thus, infinite-step opacity
and K-step opacity can be verified using BRG analysis rather
than reachability graph analysis, which provides advantages in
terms of computational complexity. And we also show that the
modified TW-observer can be effectively applied to reduce the
computational complexity of the solution. For Petri nets whose
unobservable subnet is acyclic, the two opacity properties can
be decided by constructing the TW-observer of the BRG.
Our future research will continue to focus on the computa-
tional complexity of these two opacity properties, and try to
find new methods to analyze in a more efficient way.
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